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Abstract
We analyze the consequences of illegally residing in a country on the likeli-
hood of reporting a crime to the police and, as a consequence, on the likelihood
to become victims of a crime. We use an immigration amnesty to address two
issues when dealing with the legal status of immigrants: it is both endogenous
as well as mostly unobserved in surveys. Right after the 1986 US Immigration
Reform and Control Act, which disproportionately legalized individuals of His-
panic origin, crime victims of Hispanic origin in cities with a large proportion
of illegal Hispanics become considerably more likely to report a crime. Non-
Hispanics show no changes. Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates that adjust for
the misclassiﬁcation of legal status imply that the reporting rate of undocu-
mented immigrants is close to 11 percent. Gaining legal status the reporting
rate triples, approaching the reporting rate of non-Hispanics. We also ﬁnd some
evidence that following the amnesty Hispanics living in metropolitan areas with
a large share of illegal migrants experience a reduction in victimization. This
is coherent with a simple behavioral model of crime that guides our empirical
strategies, where amnesties increase the reporting rate of legalized immigrants,
which, in turn, modify the victimization of natives and migrants.
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1 Introduction
In 2014 the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States
reached 11.3 million (representing 3.5 percent of the entire population), up from about
3.5 million in 1990 (Krogstad and Passel, 2014, Warren and Warren, 2013).
One of the most controversial issues is how to deal with this high number of un-
documented immigrants,1 with the main policy option being immigration amnesties.
Yet, amnesties polarize the electorate.2 Public opinion polls show that citizens tend
to fear that illegal immigration might not just bring lost jobs and rising welfare costs
but also high rates of crime, even if there is no evidence that immigration overall
increases crime or incarceration rates (Butcher and Piehl, 1998, Piehl, 2007) or that
it severely worsens labor market outcomes of natives (Borjas, 1994, Card, 1990).
Because of such anti-immigration sentiments, a comprehensive immigration reform
has eluded the US Congress, and a perfectly divided US Supreme Court has recently
blocked President Obama's Immigration Plan that would have shielded up to half of
the undocumented immigrant population from deportation, allowing them to work in
the US. European institutions, subject to similar political pressure, cannot agree on a
common immigration policy. Anti-immigration sentiments have fueled the BREXIT
vote in the UK referendum, and more anti-immigration acts may follow in other
European countries.
A thorough evaluation of the various consequences of unauthorized migration
represents the most likely solution to such gridlock. There is growing evidence on
the positive consequences of immigration amnesties. Economists have shown that
1Throughout the study we use the words unauthorized, undocumented, and illegal inter-
changeably to deﬁne immigrants who are illegally residing in the country.
2See for instance http://www.pollingreport.com/immigration.htm.
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amnesties allow undocumented immigrants to access segments of the labor market
granting enhanced employment protection, better working conditions, higher salaries,
and the possibility to beneﬁt from better health-care (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark,
2002, Lozano and Sorensen, 2011). And, as recently pointed out by the Washington
Post (Badger, November 26, 2014), acquiring legal status might inﬂuence many more
outcomes. Immigrants who beneﬁt from an amnesty might invest more in education,
in community institutions, as well as in political participation. They may become
more likely to learn English, and their children might become more likely to go to
college, or to experience upward mobility.
A standard opportunity cost argument, which has also recently been supported
by empirical evidence (Baker, 2015, Freedman et al., 2013, Mastrobuoni and Pinotti,
2015), implies that, ceteris paribus, documented immigrants have a lower propensity
to be involved in criminal activities than undocumented ones. As a result, immigra-
tion amnesties should reduce immigrants' participation in crime.
This study contributes to this debate providing evidence on an important negative
consequence of illegally residing in the country which is directly borne by the undoc-
umented immigrants: the inability to protect their property and their human right to
security. We show that out of fear of deportation undocumented immigrants drasti-
cally lower their propensity to report a crime to the police, generating an essentially
unenforced space of action for ruthless criminals.
Amnesties might thus not only improve the labor market opportunities of immi-
grants, thus lowering their criminal propensity, they might also increase reporting
rates and thus alter the expected cost of criminal behavior for immigrants and non-
immigrants alike, increasing deterrence.
The evidence on the reporting behavior of undocumented immigrants is still scarce,
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as it either relies on correlational studies that do not measure legal status or on studies
that do measure legal status but only for small convenience samples. In search for
such evidence we use the National Crime Victimization Survey around the 1986 US
immigration amnesty (the Immigration Reform and Control Act, IRCA) to deal with
the endogeneity of legal status as well as with its measurement issue.
We show not only that undocumented immigrants are considerably less likely to
report a crime to the police, but also that amnesties dramatically alter this situation.
We develop a simple empirical strategy to circumvent the main issue when dealing
with illegal migrants: in most household surveys legal status is unobservable.3 For
example, when addressing the question about legal status and reporting behavior, the
US National Crime Victimization Survey does not collect information on the legal
status of respondents. Yet, if there is a good proxy for the legal status, with known
probabilities of misclassiﬁcation, there are simple econometric techniques to adjust
the biased estimates that rely on the proxy (see Aigner, 1973). We adapt this strategy
to a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences setup, around the IRCA, which granted legal status to
about 2.7 million undocumented immigrants (out of 3 million who applied). Since
most immigrants who applied for the amnesty were from Central American countries,
mainly Mexico, we use Hispanic origin as a proxy for legal status. The 1980 and
1990 Census have information on citizenship (including legal status), Hispanic origin,
and immigration year of respondents, which we use to derive the probabilities of
misclassiﬁcation.
Using this adjusted proxy method we show that amnesties change the immi-
grants' incentives to report a crime. Following the IRCA amnesty, as the risk of
deportation ceased to exist for IRCA applicants, the reporting rates of eligible un-
3An important exception is the US Census, a feature that we are going to exploit.
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documented immigrants went from 11 percent to 31 percent, approaching the 40
percent reporting rates of non-Hispanics (almost all of which are legal residents).
Since police investigations are unlikely to start without a formal report of the
oﬀence, amnesties are likely to increase conviction rate of criminals whose victim is
a newly legalized individual, therefore changing the relative beneﬁts of victimizing
immigrants versus natives. Whenever ethnicity or other observable characteristics
signal the legal status of immigrants, criminals may choose their targets based on
such signals. We develop a model of crime where the comparative statics highlight
the identiﬁcation strategy for this amnesty-induced displacement of victimization.
Society is composed of two ethnic groups, a native ethnic group and an immigrant
ethnic group. Natives and immigrants (both the documented and the undocumented
ones) choose whether or not to become criminals, and, in the latter case, against
which ethnic group to commit crimes. Criminals trade-oﬀ the higher expected booty
they can collect targeting more auent native citizens with the lower probability of
being convicted when targeting poorer immigrants. The model predicts amnesties to
reduce the victimization of immigrants, and more so in places where a large fraction
of immigrants become legalized, delivering a clear diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy.
We ﬁnd evidence that following the 1986 IRCA amnesty Hispanics living in metropoli-
tan statistical areas with a large fraction of undocumented immigrants were less likely
to become victims of crime. This implies not only that undocumented immigrants are
unable to protect some of their fundamental human rights, but also that the absence
of this fundamental human right makes them even more vulnerable. It also means
that the deterrent eﬀect of law enforcement might be severely damped by the mere
existence of such victims.
This paper is related to the literature on the social and economic eﬀects of immi-
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gration, immigration restrictions, and amnesties. Generating sudden changes to the
legal status of immigrants, amnesties help better understand the various consequences
of residing illegally in a country. Focussing on the 1986 IRCA, which legalized mostly
immigrants of Hispanic origin, a few studies have shown that the reform increased job
mobility and earnings amongst Hispanic immigrants (see Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark
(2002), Lozano and Sorensen (2011), and Barcellos (2010)), while others have found
that it reduced crime rates (see Baker (2015) and Freedman et al. (2013)). This paper
also exploits the IRCA, in particular its disproportionate impact on immigrants of
Hispanic origin.
There is also evidence from other countries showing that granting legal status
changes the criminal involvement of immigrants. Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015)
exploit exogenous variation in legal status following the January 2007 European Union
enlargement, while Pinotti (2014) employs Italian data on legalization lotteries.4 Both
studies ﬁnd similarly sized large negative legalization eﬀects on the criminal behavior
of immigrants.5
A few convenience sample studies document the low propensity of undocumented
immigrants to report crimes to the police. Based on interviews in Memphis, Ten-
nessee, Bucher et al. (2010) ﬁnd that these individuals experience a high rate of
victimization and yet are reluctant to report crimes to the police, mainly because of
the perceived risk of deportation.
That fear of deportation may induce underreporting amongst Latino immigrants'
has also been mentioned in a study about immigrants in Phoenix, Arizona (Menjívar
4Pinotti (2015) also provides evidence that stricter enforcement of migration policy reduces the
crime rate of undocumented immigrants.
5Several studies do not focus on amnesties but rather on the overall eﬀect of immigration on crime.
The results are rather mixed, although most recent studies ﬁnd little evidence that immigration spurs
crime (see, among others, Bianchi et al. (2012) and Bell et al. (2013).)
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and Bejarano, 2004), and in one about immigrants in Reno, Nevada (Correia, 2010).6.
The only study that uses a large and representative sample ﬁnds that crime reporting
rates are negatively correlated with the relative size of noncitizen and foreign-born
individuals living in a metropolitan area (Gutierrez and Kirk, 2015). The authors use
the National Crime Victimization Survey, a survey we are also going to draw on for
our empirical analysis.
In spirit this study is also closely related to recent research on the determinants of
crime reporting of women and victimization against them. Miller and Segal (2014) use
the NCVS to show that the integration of women in US police departments increased
the reporting behavior of women who were victims of violent crimes, especially do-
mestic violence. Consistent with our ﬁnding, they ﬁnd that the increased reporting
behavior leads to subsequent reductions in crime.
That higher reporting rates might reduce the incentives to commit a crime has
been discussed in more general terms in some theoretical studies (Garoupa, 2003) as
well as in some empirical ones (Goldberg and Nold, 1980, Goudriaan et al., 2006).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches a simple model of crime and
reporting behavior (all proofs are in the appendix). Results from the model guide the
empirical strategy developed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a society composed of two ethnic groups: natives, with mass M > 0,
and immigrants, with mass 1; immigrants are either legal citizens (mass 1 − γ) or
undocumented (mass 0 < γ < 1). We use the term immigrants loosely to indicate
6See also Barrick (2014)
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minorities that contain a group of undocumented immigrants. Later in our empirical
section we focus on Hispanic individuals and call them immigrants even if some of
them might have been born in the United States. Individuals diﬀer in terms of their
wealth: all immigrants are poor, while natives can be rich (mass M − φ) or poor
(mass φ). While this is a simplifying assumption, in our case income diﬀerences
between Hispanics and Non-Hispanics are shown to be large in the National Crime
and Victimization Survey (see Figure 2). Household incomes are only available in
broad intervals, but relative income diﬀerences between the two groups are at least
equal to 1/4, and don't seem to depend on whether individuals have been victimized.
Each individual chooses whether to be honest or to commit crimes. Criminals
then choose which ethnic group to target, subject to some error, as we specify later.
Finally, honest individuals who are victimized decide whether to report the crime to
the police.
Each individual is identiﬁed by a triple (t, j, k), where t ∈ {r, p} denotes his wealth,
rich (r) or poor (p), j ∈ {n, i} his ethnicity, native (n) or immigrant (i), and ﬁnally
k ∈ {l, a} his legal status, either legal citizen (l), or undocumented immigrant, for
brevity, alien (a).
The utility of an individual of type (t, j, k) who chooses to be honest is:
uhont,j,k = f(wt, ρt,k)− τ(Xj, X−j),
where wt is his wealth (with wr > wp) and ρt,k is the propensity to report a crime,
which, as we show below, depends on both his wealth (whether he is rich or poor,
t ∈ {r, p}) and his legal status (whether he is a legal citizen or an alien, k ∈ {l, a}).
We assume that the wellbeing of honest individuals is increasing in wealth and in
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the reporting rate, ρt,k, as reporting implies an ability to protect the property rights:
f(wt, ρt,k) is diﬀerentiable with ∂f(wt, ρt,k)/∂wt > 0 and ∂f(wt, ρt,k)/∂ρt,k > 0. The
function τ(Xj, X−j) measures the disutility from victimization that an individual
of ethnicity j suﬀers, which depends on the number of criminals trying to target
his own ethnicity, Xj, and, because of the targeting error, on the number of those
trying to target the other one, X−j; τ(Xj, X−j) is a diﬀerentiable function with
∂τ(Xj, X−j)/∂Xj ≥ ∂τ(Xj, X−j)/∂X−j > 0.
Criminals do not know the individual characteristics (wealth and reporting rate)
of their victims, but observe signals about their legal status. In the US, where most
undocumented immigrants are of Hispanic origin, ethnicity would be such a signal.
Hence, we assume that criminals choose which ethnic group to target, natives or
immigrants, based on their expected wealth and on their expected reporting behavior.
In particular, committing a crime against an individual belonging to the ethnic
group j ∈ {n, i}, yields θpi(w¯j)− C(ρ¯j). The expected booty, pi(w¯j), is an increasing
function of w¯j, the average wealth of the honest individuals belonging to ethnic group
j; given the fraction of rich and poor individuals in each ethnic group, it follows
that w¯n = (φ/M)wp + ((M − φ)/M)wr and w¯i = wp. The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]
measures the individual's criminal ability, i.e. his ability to appropriate the value of
the booty. C(ρ¯j) is the expected punishment which is assumed to be an increasing
and concave function of ρ¯j, the reporting rate characterizing ethnic group j; recalling
that the reporting rate depends on wealth and legal status, it follows that ρ¯n =
(φ/M)ρp,l + ((M − φ)/M)ρr,l and ρ¯i = (1 − γ)ρp,l+ γρp,a. Finally, we assume that
with some positive probability (1− ξ) < 1/2 a criminal who targets group j commits
a crime against an individual of group −j.7
7This might occur because of several reasons. For instance, the criminal might mistakenly believe
9
Summarizing, the expected utility of a native with criminal ability θ who chooses
to become a criminal and to target ethnic group j ∈ {n, i} is:
ucrn,j(θ) = θΠ(w¯j, w¯−j)− ξC(ρ¯j)− (1− ξ)C(ρ¯−j)− τ(Xn, Xi),
where Π(w¯j, w¯−j) = ξpi(w¯j) + (1− ξ)pi(w¯−j).
The expected utility of a criminal immigrant with ability θ who targets ethnic
group j ∈ {n, i} is the same, except for the last term that now becomes τ(Xi, Xn).
2.1 The reporting decision
We assume that the monetary loss that a victim of a crime suﬀers is not deterministic;
for instance, it may depend on the amount of money that the victim is carrying.
More speciﬁcally, a honest citizen whose wealth is wt suﬀers a loss αwt ∈ [0, wt] when
victimized; α is the realization of a random variable distributed according to F (α),
with support [0, 1]. We assume that the victim reports the crime to the police when
the monetary loss is larger than the cost of reporting; formally, this occurs when:
αwt ≥ T + gkD , or α ≥ T + gkD
wt
≡ α¯t,k,
where T is a ﬁxed cost of reporting crime, gk is the probability of deportation -
which is zero for legal citizens and positive for undocumented immigrants (evidence
is provided in the empirical section) - and D is the associated cost. Notice that the
threshold α¯t,k becomes smaller with the level of wealth, wt, while it becomes larger
with the probability, gk, and the cost of deportation, D; hence α¯p,a > α¯p,l > α¯r,l.
that the victim belongs to group j while she actually belongs to group −j; alternatively, a criminal
acting in the neighborhoods where most of his target citizens live might end up committing a crime
against individuals of the other group who are spending time or residing in those neighborhoods.
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The probability that a honest individual reports a crime is simply ρt,k ≡ 1−F (α¯t,k) .
Since α¯p,a > α¯p,l > α¯r,l, it follows that ρr,l > ρp,l > ρp,a: the propensity to report a
crime to the police is largest for rich natives, lowest for undocumented immigrants,
and intermediate for legal immigrants and poor natives.
2.2 Being honest or criminal?
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their ability to commit crimes. Specif-
ically, we assume that θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1] for all types
(t, j, k). Individuals observes their ability before deciding whether to become crimi-
nals.
Criminals prefer to target natives whenever:8
θ ≥ C(ρ¯n)− C(ρ¯i)
pi(w¯n)− pi(w¯i) ≡ θ¯.
The relevant trade-oﬀ when deciding the target ethnic group is between a larger
expected booty from crime when targeting natives (since w¯n > w¯i) with a smaller
expected punishment when targeting immigrants (since ρ¯i < ρ¯n). It follows that
criminals with higher abilities (θ ≥ θ¯) prefer to target natives rather than immigrants.
The low ability individuals need to decide whether to be honest or target the
immigrant group. We assume that wr is large enough so that all rich natives prefer
to be honest. Poor natives and legal immigrants have the same wealth as well as the
reporting rate, and therefore behave in the same way; they prefer to commit crimes
targeting ethnic group i rather than being honest whenever:9
8Formally, a native criminal compares ucrn,n(θ) with u
cr
n,i(θ) while an immigrant criminal u
cr
i,n(θ)
with ucri,i(θ).
9Formally, a poor native compares uhonp,n,l with u
cr
n,i(θ) while a legal immigrant compares u
hon
p,i,l with
ucri,i(θ).
11
θ ≥ f(wp, ρp,l) + ξC(ρ¯i) + (1− ξ)C(ρ¯n)
Π(w¯i, w¯n)
≡ θˆp.
The above condition says that a poor native/legal immigrant prefers to commit
oﬀences rather than being honest when his/her criminal ability is large enough: θ ≥
θˆp.
Similarly, for undocumented immigrants, committing crimes targeting immigrants
is preferred to being honest when:10
θ ≥ f(wp, ρp,a) + ξC(ρ¯i) + (1− ξ)C(ρ¯n)
Π(w¯i, w¯n)
≡ θˆa.
Looking more closely to the thresholds θˆp and θˆa, it follows that undocumented
immigrants have a higher propensity to become criminals than poor natives/legal
immigrants, θˆa < θˆp. This is due to their lower reporting rate (ρp,a < ρp,l) which
implies a reduced ability to protect their property rights when being honest.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the equilibrium choices of undoc-
umented immigrants depending on θ: individuals with low criminal ability (θ < θˆa)
prefer to be honest, those with intermediate ability (θˆa ≤ θ < θ¯) become criminals
and target immigrants, while individuals with high criminal skills (θ ≥ θ¯) become
criminals who target natives.11 For poor natives/legal immigrants the equilibrium
choices and their graphical representation are similar, with threshold θˆp in place of
θˆa.
Recalling that γ represents the mass of undocumented immigrants while (1−γ+φ)
represents the mass of poor natives and legal immigrants, it follows that the number
10Undocumented immigrants compare uhonp,i,a with u
cr
i,i(θ).
11We focus on the most interesting case θˆa < θ¯ which implies that both ethnic groups are targeted
by criminals.
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1
Figure 1: Equilibrium choice of undocumented immigrants
of criminals targeting immigrants and natives is:
Xi = γ(θ¯ − θˆa) + (1− γ + φ)(θ¯ − θˆp) (1)
and
Xn = γ(1− θ¯) + (1− γ + φ)(1− θ¯) = (1 + φ)(1− θ¯). (2)
Moreover, since criminals targeting group j ∈ {n, i} commit crimes against mem-
bers of the other group with probability (1 − ξ), the number of criminals to which
immigrants and natives are actually exposed to is:
Xexi = ξXi + (1− ξ)Xn, (3)
Xexn = ξXn + (1− ξ)Xi. (4)
2.3 The eﬀect of an amnesty
Next we consider the eﬀects of an amnesty which legalizes a fraction x ∈ (0, 1] of un-
documented immigrants. The amnesty eliminates the risk of deportation, increasing
their reporting rate from ρp,a to ρp,l; this, in turn, allows immigrants to better protect
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their property rights. As a consequence, the average reporting rate of immigrants
goes up to ρ¯i(x) = (1 − γ + γx)ρp,l+ γ(1 − x)ρp,a. Notice that the change in the
average reporting rate of immigrants, ρ¯i(x) − ρ¯i = γx(ρp,l − ρp,a), is increasing in γ,
the initial share of undocumented immigrants.
Proposition 1 characterizes the impact of amnesties on the overall level of crime
as well as the victimization of each targeted groups.
Proposition 1. Amnesties reduce the overall number of criminals. They also re-
duce the share of criminals targeting immigrants (increasing the share of criminals
targeting natives). These changes increase with γ, the initial share of undocumented
immigrants.
The overall level of crime drops because of two eﬀects. First, the increase in the
average reporting rate of immigrants raises the expected cost of punishment, reducing
criminals' payoﬀs (θˆp and θˆa increase). In addition, without the risk of deportation,
legalized immigrants are better able to protect their property and their reporting rate
increases from ρp,a to ρp,l. This reduces their propensity to become criminals as θˆp,
rather than θˆa, becomes the relevant threshold. Moreover, amnesties also change the
distribution of crime. Because of the higher reporting rate of immigrants, some of
those who decide to remain criminals may be better oﬀ targeting natives rather than
immigrants (θ¯ decreases).
These changes reduce the share of criminals that try to target immigrants. Since
the increase in the average reporting rate of immigrants is proportional to γ, all these
changes are larger when the initial share of undocumented immigrants is larger.
The next proposition established how amnesties change the number of crimes,
rather than the share of crimes, committed against natives and immigrants: Xexn and
Xexi .
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Proposition 2. An amnesty reduces the number of crimes committed against immi-
grants, while depending on the parameter ξ it can either increase or decrease those
committed against natives. The reduction in the victimization of immigrants grows
with the initial share of undocumented immigrants.
Amnesties change the overall level of crime as well as its distribution across eth-
nicities. The two eﬀects reinforce each other in the case of the immigrants, causing
a reduction in their victimization (Xexi reduces). By contrast, they work in opposite
direction in the case of the natives. When ξ is closer to 1/2, meaning that criminals
are more likely to mistakenly target the wrong ethnicity, natives beneﬁt substantially
from the reduction in the overall level of crime and native victimization rates decrease.
When ξ is closer to one the shift in the criminal target is the dominant eﬀect, and
native victimization rates increase (larger Xexn ).
All these changes are more marked when a larger fraction of immigrants become
legalized (larger γ), a comparative status result that we are going to exploit in our
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy (see Section 4.1.2).
Summarizing, amnesties are predicted to:
- reduce immigrants' fear of deportation, and thus increase their crime reporting;
- reduce the payoﬀ of victimizing immigrants;
- reduce the overall number of criminals; not only because some victims are more
likely to report a crime but also because immigrants are now better able to
protect their own property, increasing their opportunity cost of becoming a
criminal;
- reduce the number of immigrants who are victims of crime.
15
All these changes, except the ﬁrst one, grow with γ, the initial share of immigrants
who are undocumented. Finally, amnesties
- can increase or reduce the number native victims, depending on how often
criminals mistakenly target a group (depending on ξ).
3 Main Data Sources and Measurement Strategies
This section describes the main data sources used in the empirical section.
3.1 Reporting and Victimization data
The analysis of crime reporting behavior and victimization relies on victimization
surveys. We use the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), conducted by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) since 1973. The survey with suﬃcient geographic
information covers the 40 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and can be
merged with geographic information on the presence of undocumented immigrants.
The survey asks a nationally representative sample of individuals about crime inci-
dents, and whether these have been reported or not to police. Crimes include rapes,
assaults, including sexual ones, robberies, purse snatching, burglaries, motor vehicle
thefts, and other thefts.
We focus on a symmetric time windowfrom 1981 to 1994around 1987 and 88,
when the IRCA applications were ﬁled (see the left panel of Fig. 3). Post 1994
years are excluded because of the 1994 Immigration and Nationality Act (which went
into eﬀect at the end of 1994) which introduced a temporary amnesty for about
half a million undocumented immigrants. Since we are going to compare reporting
and victimization rates for Hispanic and non-Hispanic respondents, we exclude race
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categories that are not Hispanic (American Indians, less 1 percent of the sample;
Asians, about 4 percent; individuals for whom no race is speciﬁed, about 7 percent).
The NCVS contains information about the age range of respondents. We focus on
adult respondents. The Summary Statistics Table 1 shows that we have an overall
sample of about one million respondents, and about 10 percent of which are victims
of a crime.12 Of these only 39 percent report the crime to the police. The list of
MSAs included in the sample is reported in Table 2.
The victimization survey contains information on whether the victim reported the
crime to the police but does not contain information about the immigration status of
respondents. To reconstruct such a measure we exploit two additional datasets.
3.2 IRCA's Legalization Summary Public Use Tape
In order to measure of the fraction of Hispanic population that was eligible for the
amnesty in each MSA we merge the NCVS survey with the administrative records of
IRCA applicants. This gives us the exact number of applicants at the MSA level (we
are going to see that the majority of applicants came from the largest MSAs). Next,
to measure the probabilities of eligibility by age, race, Hispanic origin, and gender we
use the 1980 Census.
3.3 CENSUS data
In order to be eligible unauthorized immigrants had to be in continuous residence
since January 1, 1982 (for a total of 5 years.) Temporary residency lasted 18 months,
after which the legalized immigrants became eligible for permanent residency (i.e.,
12For respondents who report being victimized several times there is one observation for each
incident. This allows us to properly characterize the incident and to properly account for multiple
victimizations.
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green cards). Approximately 1.75 million people applied for legalization through the
program and about 94% of applications were approved for temporary residency.13
The 1980 and 1990 decennial Censuses from the IPUMS allow us to estimate the
population of Hispanic and non-Hispanic individuals, by MSA, race, age, and gender.
While the IRCA years do not coincide with a Census year, we show that the estimated
fractions of eligible individuals are very similar, no matter whether we use the 1980
or the 1990 Census.
3.4 Measurement Strategies
We exploit two features about the 1986 IRCA amnesty to circumvent the issue that
immigration status and legal status are both unobserved in the victimization surveys.
The ﬁrst is that Hispanics represent the grand majority of applicants and can thus
be used as a proxy for illegal migrants. The left panel of Figure 3 shows, based on
administrative records about IRCA applicants (see Section 3.2), that between 1987
and 1988 about 1.6 million Hispanics applied for legal status in the Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Areas (MSAs) covered by the NCVS. The number of non-Hispanic applicants
was almost an order of magnitude smaller. Given that Hispanics made up only about
10 percent of the total population, the likelihood that someone of Hispanic origin was
an IRCA applicant is about two orders of magnitude larger than for non-Hispanics
(see Table 1). Using Hispanic origin as proxy for legal status is subject to misclas-
siﬁcation, an issue we are going to tackle further down. The right panel of Figure
3 shows, based on Immigration and Naturalization Service data, that the number of
13Alternatively, in more rural places the Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program provided
permanent residency to aliens who could demonstrate they had 60 days of seasonal agricultural work
experience in qualifying crops from May 1985 to May 1986. Nearly 1.3 million people applied for
the SAW program.
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yearly deportations fell immediately after the IRCA, and started growing again in
1990, which is something we are going to come back shortly.
The second feature that we exploit is that the distribution of applicants across US
cities was quite uneven. Not only it is more likely to ﬁnd undocumented immigrants
in places with large numbers of immigrants, in such places immigrants are also more
likely to live in segregated neighborhoods, which makes it even easier for criminals to
target such groups.
The MSA-NCVS version of the US victimization survey can be linked with the
US Census, which has information on the legal status of immigrants, and also asks
respondents whether they were residing in the United States 5 years earlier. Those
are the two main eligibility conditions for the IRCA, which can be used to predict
not just the number of applicants in a given MSA but also the fraction of Hispanics
who are eligible to apply, which is an essential part of our model, corresponding to
the γ parameter in Section 2.
In order to assess whether the Census can be used to predict the eligibility rate, in
Figure 4 we correlate the predicted number of eligible immigrants (from the Census)
with the number of actual applicants (from the IRCA administrative ﬁles). There is
a very strong correlation, even if the none of the Censuses corresponds to the year
the IRCA took place.14 Since population estimates would be based on the Census
the ﬁgure implies that the fraction of eligible immigrants would also be very similar.
While no Census data are available for the year the IRCA took place, Figure 5 shows
that at the MSA level the estimated fraction of eligible immigrants based on the 1980
Census are very similar to the ones based on the 1990 Census. This is driven by the
fact that migration ﬂows across diﬀerent regions tend to be persistent over time.
14We use the log to make sure that such relationship is not driven by outliers.
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We use the predicted fraction of eligible immigrants of Hispanic origin to separate
low from high undocumented Hispanic immigration cities. The exact eligibility
rates can be seen in Table 2, where numbers in bold indicate MSAs in the top tercile
in terms of fraction of undocumented Hispanics (ﬁrst column). The city with the
largest fraction of undocumented immigrants of Hispanic origin is Miami, Florida,
followed by several Californian cities (Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco).
On the other side of the spectrum we ﬁnd cities like Columbus, Ohio, or Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, where the fraction is predicted to be close to zero. The remaining
columns show the estimated
4 Reporting Behavior, Victimization, and Legal Sta-
tus
4.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
We model two diﬀerent behaviors, the victims' reporting behavior as a function of
whether they are legal immigrants or not, and the criminals' ethnic targeting be-
havior as a function of whether there is a large or small fraction of undocumented
immigrants in the city (large or small γ), and we allow these behaviors to change with
the IRCA.
Right before the IRCA we know that at least 3 million undocumented immigrants
resided in the United States (the applicants), while after the IRCA an estimated
ﬂow of 800 thousand undocumented immigrants would enter the country every year
(Warren and Warren, 2013). We also know that by the 1990 the estimated stock
of undocumented immigrants had already reached 3.5 million (Warren and Warren
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(2013)). This implies that the IRCA eﬀect should be a short-lived, as the stock of
eligible migrants would quickly mix with the new ﬂows of ineligible migrants (Orrenius
and Zavodny, 2003). For this reason in most regressions we simply exclude 1989 and
1990 from our regressions (though we do show the entire evolution of reporting and
victimization rates including those two years, and including the two years does not
signiﬁcantly alter the results).
4.1.1 Reporting Behavior
Our theoretical model predicts that undocumented immigrants should increase their
reporting following the IRCA, while natives should not. This leads to an empirical
strategy where we compare the indicator variable for reporting a crime to the police
(R = 0, 1) depending on Hispanic (H = 1) and the non-Hispanic (H = 0) origin
of the victim in the two IRCA amnesty years, 1987 and 1988, with those before
(PRE = 1981− 1986) and after (POST = 1989− 1994) the amnesty:
Rit = β
POSTHi × POSTt + βPREHi × PREt + βHHi + ξ′Xi + i. (5)
The vector of regressors Xi contains year and MSA ﬁxed eﬀects, and in some speci-
ﬁcations crime-type ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as MSA speciﬁc time trends. Errors can be
correlated across individuals living in the same MSA in a given year.
Given that from the victims' perspective the aim is to estimate these diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences conditional on being an IRCA applicant A as opposed to just an Hispanic
immigrant H, the estimates are subject to misclassiﬁcation bias. On one side, not all
Hispanics were eligible and applied for the amnesty, P (A = 1|H = 1) = γ < 1, on the
other side, some non-Hispanic might also have applied, or P (A = 0|H = 0) = q < 1.
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Since most eligible applicants are believed to have applied (which is unsurprising
given the incentives of becoming legalized), these errors stem from Hispanics who
who entered the country after January 1, 1982 (they had been resident for less than
5 years at the time of the IRCA), as well as from those who were already US citizen
by the time of the IRCA.
The misclassiﬁcation probabilities 1 − γ and 1 − q are known to bias the results
towards zero (Aigner, 1973).15 As we discussed in the Data section, using the Cen-
sus we can compute the probability that someone of Hispanic origin is not only an
undocumented immigrant but also eligible (and most likely applied) for the amnesty.
We can also compute the probability that a non-Hispanic is eligible for the amnesty.
The last four Columns of Table 2 show the fraction of eligible immigrants for Hispan-
ics and non-Hispanics predicted based on the 1980 and 1990 Census. The fraction
for non-Hispanics is an estimate of 1 − q, while for Hispanics it is an estimate of γ.
Across all States, the estimated q is between 97 and 98 percent, while the estimated
p is between 20 and 25 percent. Since the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences are downward
biased by a factor equal to γ + q − 1, they have to be inﬂated by a factor that lies
between 4 and 5. Since the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate is going to be more pre-
cisely estimated in MSAs with a suﬃcient number of illegal Hispanics we also provide
separate estimates depending on the presence of Hispanics and illegal Hispanics.
15Assuming that conditional on the application status Hispanic origin does not matter, or
E(R|H,A) = E(R|A) we have that
E (R|H = 1, T = t) = γE (R|A = 1, T = t) + (1− γ)E (R|A = 0, T = t)
E (R|H = 0, T = t) = qE (R|A = 0, T = t) + (1− q)E (R|A = 1, T = t) .
Taking a diﬀerence, and rearranging we get that
E (R|H = 1, T = t)− E (R|H = 0, T = t) = [γ + q − 1] [E (R|A = 1, T = t)− E (R|A = 0, T = t)] .
Taking a diﬀerence of this diﬀerence across diﬀerent T s we get that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence is
still biased by the factor γ + q − 1.
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4.1.2 Victimization Behavior
According to our model Hispanics are estimated to be victimized at lower rates follow-
ing the IRCA, and the changes are predicted to be increasing in the share γ of eligible
immigrants in the MSA. Victimization rates against non-Hispanics might increase or
decrease depending on the degree of spillovers in victimization across ethnicity (de-
pending on ξ). For this reason the ideal diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy compares
victimization rates of individuals of Hispanic origin in places with large and small
γs. We compare victimization rates in MSAs in the top tercile of γ with those in
the bottom two, though we also provide a full spectrum of robustness checks around
these thresholds.
Unlike what happens for reporting, predictions are about diﬀerences based on
ethnicity rather than IRCA eligibility, which implies that the estimates do not need to
be adjusted for misclassiﬁcation. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model in victimization
(V = 0, 1) which is run separately for Hispanics and non-Hispanics is:
Vit = β
POSTTOP (γ)i × POSTt + βPRETOP (γ)i × PREt + ξ′Xi + i. (6)
The indicator variable TOP (γ)i indicates whether the individual resides in a MSA
within the top tercile of the fraction of IRCA eligible undocumented immigrants of
Hispanic origin over the entire Hispanic population. For the top tercile γ averages 16.8
percent, while it averages 8.8 percent for the bottom two terciles. When we compute
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences for the full range of diﬀerent percentiles we combine the
two coeﬃcients βPOST and βPRE into one βPOST |PRE.16 The regressors Xi contain
year and MSA ﬁxed eﬀects, and in some speciﬁcations MSA speciﬁc time trends. We
16The regression becomes Vit = β
POST |PRETOP (γ)i × (POSTt + PREt) + ξ′Xi + i.
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allow errors to be correlated across individuals living in the same MSA in a given
year.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Reporting Rates
The evolution of the diﬀerences in reporting rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanics
are shown in the left panel of Figure 6.17 The right panel refers to MSAs with a large
fraction of undocumented immigrants of Hispanic origin. The ﬁrst thing to notice is
that in communities with many undocumented immigrants reporting rates for Hispan-
ics and non-Hispanics diﬀer by about 5.5 percentage points (33.2 versus 38.7 percent).
Later we will see that in MSAs with few undocumented Hispanics natives and im-
migrants have very similar reporting rates. In both panels the only years where the
reporting rates are quite close to each other are 1987, 1988 and 1989. Then they start
diverging again, in line with growing numbers of undocumented Hispanics who keep
on entering the country. It is comforting to notice that the ﬁgure shows no pre-trends
in the diﬀerence between Hispanics and Non-Hispanics, which is a necessary condition
for the appropriateness of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy.
Assuming that the reporting rate of legalized immigrants is the same as the one for
natives one can use γ to compute the unobserved reporting rate of illegal Hispanics.
The overall Hispanic reporting rate is equal to a weighted average of reporting rates
of legal Hispanics (0.387) and illegal Hispanics (ρp,a in the notation of the model),
where the weights are given by the p = 0.20 and 1−p: 0.332 = 0.20ρp,a+0.80×0.387.
Solving for the reporting rate of illegal Hispanic immigrants ρp,a = 11.2 percent.
17The raw series for each group is shown in Figure 9.
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Illegal immigrants who are victimized appear to be almost four times less likely
to report a crime (11.2 percent versus 38.7 percent). The observed diﬀerence in
reporting rates shrinks to 1.5 percentage points in 1987 and 1988. The diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimate in reporting rates is about 4 percentage points. When inﬂated by
a factor of 5 (one over p), the estimate implies that reporting rates among recently
legalized immigrants increase by about 20 percentage points, almost as large as those
of non-Hispanic individuals (almost all of whom are legal citizens).
Whether these diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant and robust when controlling
for potential confounders is evidenced in Table 3. We estimate Equation 5 using
a linear probability model.18 In the ﬁrst three columns we do not separate MSAs
into those with small and large Hispanic communities but add more and more con-
founders (ﬁrst year and MSA dummies, then socioeconomic variables, and, ﬁnally,
crime dummies). The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences are always negative and on average
close to 3 percentage points. The post-eﬀects are signiﬁcant while the pre-eﬀects are
not. Adding potential confounders slightly lowers the negative eﬀect on reporting
of being Hispanic. When focussing on MSAs with large fraction of Illegal Hispanics
the estimates become much more precise. The same is true when focussing on MSAs
with large fraction of Hispanics, whether illegally residing in the country or not. The
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences are all negative and signiﬁcant, and are not too far from the
4 percentage points diﬀerences that we discussed when looking at Figure 9.
Table 4 shows that there are almost no diﬀerences in the eﬀects across economic
crimes (theft, burglaries, robberies and other crimes), while the estimates appear
to be more noisy for violent ones (robbery and assault). Most estimates based on
18In order to reduce the misclassiﬁcation error we exclude the two years following the IRCA from
the regression analysis (1989 and 1990). As from the evidence shown in the Figure, adding the 1989
to the IRCA years slightly increases the eﬀect while adding also the 1990 slightly reduces the eﬀect.
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individual crime types are negative, though statistical power becomes an issue.
4.2.2 Victimization Rates
The left panel of Figure 7 shows the diﬀerence in Hispanic victimization rates between
MSAs with large and small γs.19 In most years victimization rates of Hispanics are
signiﬁcantly larger in MSAs in the top tercile vs. MSAs in the bottom two terciles
in the fraction of undocumented immigrants of Hispanic origin. The only two years
where victimization rates are aligned are 1987 and 1988. Yet, there is evidence of a
decreasing pre-trend in the diﬀerences between MSAs with large and small γs. For
this reason, later in the regressions, we control for MSA speciﬁc trends. There are no
apparent changes for non-Hispanics, and also no evidence of pre-trends.
Estimating Equation 6 using a linear probability model of victimization, we ﬁnd
similar eﬀects to the ones shown in the ﬁgures (see Table 5). Comparing victimization
probabilities of Hispanics, depending on whether they live in MSAs with a small or
a large fraction of undocumented immigrants, both before, during, and after the
IRCA, we ﬁnd evidence that during the IRCA years victimization rates dropped
by about 3 percentage points (-30 percent). The ﬁrst three columns show that the
results are robust to various controls (age, gender, number of household members, and
income). Adding MSA level time trends in Column 3 only one of the two diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences remains signiﬁcant. The last three columns show that there is no clear
evidence with respect to native victims.
Since the treatment and control separation around the tercile is arbitrary, in Figure
8 we test whether the eﬀects are robust to a diﬀerent choice of treatment and control
MSAs. Each dot corresponds to a separate diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences in victimization
19The raw series for each group is shown in Figure 10.
26
rates among Hispanics (vertical caps shows the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals). There
are a total of 41 MSAs and starting from the left we use the bottom 28 MSAs (2/3) in
terms of γ as our control cities and only the top 2 MSAs as our treatment cities. Then
as one moves to the right more and more MSAs are added to the treatment group in
descending order with respect to γ. Once the 13th MSA is added to the treatment
group, MSAs that used to be in the control group are added to the treatment group.
We stop when the treatment group contains 3/4 of the MSAs. The diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences is decreasing as one adds MSAs with a lower fraction of undocumented
immigrants within the Hispanic population, but the eﬀects are signiﬁcant all the way
to the 28th MSA, where 2/3 of the MSA are in the treatment group and 1/3 are in
the control group.
The results are robust to the exclusion of the ﬁrst two years before the IRCA, 1984
and 1985 (see Column 1 of Table 6), and to the exclusion of Los Angeles (Column
2) or New York City (Column 3). The last 4 columns show that in line with the
reporting results the changes in victimization show up for both violent and economic
crimes.
4.2.3 Summary of the Results
Wrapping up, we ﬁnd evidence that following the IRCA Hispanic victims became more
likely to report crimes to the police, especially in MSAs where they were more likely
to be undocumented. Taking into account the large degree of misclassiﬁcation, the
changes are sizable, increasing by a factor of three to four their reporting rates. When
it comes to victimization patterns, during the IRCA Hispanics become less likely to
be victimized in communities where they are very likely to have been legalized (large
γ). In line with the model's predictions with intermediate ξ (probability of targeting
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the wrong ethnic group), there is no evidence of crime displacement against non-
Hispanics.
5 Conclusions
We provide evidence that out of fear of deportation undocumented immigrants are
considerably less likely to report crimes to the police compared to natives (11 percent
against 38 percent). This implies that the estimated 11.3 million undocumented
immigrants are unable to safeguard their fundamental right to protect their property
and their human right to security.
The 1986 US amnesty that provided legal status to 2.7 million immigrants, mainly
of Hispanic origin, allows for a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy that deals with the
issue that in victimization surveys information about legal status is unavailable. It
also deals with the issue that legal status is typically endogenous. Right after the
amnesty Hispanic immigrants become considerably more likely to report a crime to
the police. Taking into account that not all Hispanic immigrants are undocumented,
the changes in reporting rates are close to 20 percentage points. These are massive
changes, with important implications for the wellbeing of undocumented migrants.
In line with the predictions of a simple model of crime, with their lower reporting
rates, immigrants become preferred victims of crime. Amnesties appear to limit the
targeting of undocumented immigrants.
While it is diﬃcult to assess the external validity of the IRCA amnesty, our results
are likely to carry over to recent undocumented immigrants residing in the United
States right now, half of which are estimated to be Mexican. In recent years US
lawmakers have partially addressed the issue. In order to favor the reporting of un-
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documented immigrants, in 2008 the US congress approved a special VISA program
(U nonimmigrant status). According to this program, every year victims of serious
oﬀences that are willing to work with local enforcement authorities are given tempo-
rary legal status and work eligibility in the United States. The U-1 Visa is unlikely to
be suﬃcient to protect immigrants' right to property and security. On one side only
violent crimes are considered. On the other side, the VISA is only temporary, up to
4 years, which might not be enough to incentivize immigrants to report the crime to
the police. And, ﬁnally, the number of U visas is capped at 10,000.
Another open question is whether our results are generalizable to other countries.
This should depend on whether, like in the US, immigrants are at risk of deportation
when reporting a crime. It also depends on whether criminals can somehow predict
the legal status of their victims. In some US cities Hispanic immigrants are likely to
be undocumented, but the same is true for African and Asian immigrants in several
developed countries.
Our analysis has additional implications that are worth mentioning. It points out
that investigating the consequences of amnesties by looking at reported crimes may
have some important undesirable pitfalls. The increase in reporting might turn out
to be a rise in crime rates even if the true crime rates decreased These eﬀects should
be carefully taken into account in the empirical investigation of amnesties, especially
when the size of the illegal immigration is large.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Victims All Min Max
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Reported the crime 0.39 0.49 - - 0 1
Crime victim 1.00 0.00 0.11 0.31 1 1
Hispanic 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.30 0 1
White 0.84 0.36 0.86 0.34 0 1
Year 1987 4 1987 4 1981 1994
Pre-IRCA 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50 0 1
Post-IRCA 0.38 0.49 0.39 0.49 0 1
Age 18-24 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35 0 1
Age 25-29 0.17 0.37 0.12 0.33 0 1
Age 29-34 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.33 0 1
Age 35-39 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31 0 1
Age 40-49 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0 1
Age 50-59 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 0 1
Female 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.50 0 1
N. obs. 114,079 1,052,603
Notes: Based on NCVS data matched with the 1980 Census.
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Table 2: Fraction of Hispanic Population by MSA (Illegal and Total)
Fraction that would be eligible for the IRCA amnesty
Predicted Fraction of Census Year 1980 Census Year 1990
MSA Eligible and Hispanic (NCVS) Non-Hispanics Hispanics Non-Hispanics Hispanics
1 Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA 2.25% 2.58% 21.35% 5.68% 29.81%
2 Atlanta, GA 0.09% 0.63% 15.06% 1.40% 19.35%
3 Baltimore, MD 0.02% 0.88% 8.71% 1.03% 10.04%
4 Boston, MA-NH 0.18% 2.48% 16.44% 3.34% 18.93%
5 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 0.15% 0.50% 12.71% 0.78% 14.79%
6 Chicago, IL 0.98% 2.05% 22.48% 2.40% 26.55%
7 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN 0.03% 0.45% 7.21% 0.57% 10.53%
8 Cleveland, Lorain, Elyria, OH 0.04% 1.48% 5.73% 1.32% 6.11%
9 Columbus, OH 0.00% 0.57% 3.83% 0.48% 1.85%
10 Dallas, TX 0.52% 0.62% 11.65% 1.78% 24.62%
11 Denver, CO 0.17% 0.94% 3.15% 1.38% 7.03%
12 Detroit, MI 0.12% 1.81% 10.61% 1.87% 7.62%
13 Fort Lauderdale, FL 1.00% 1.72% 18.96% 4.47% 23.78%
14 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1.54% 1.51% 17.90%
15 Houston, TX 1.26% 1.07% 13.22% 2.43% 26.18%
16 Kansas City, MO-KS 0.04% 0.35% 6.20% 0.49% 9.06%
17 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 5.54% 3.62% 28.75% 7.93% 35.50%
18 Miami, FL 13.46% 2.87% 42.36% 8.27% 37.44%
19 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 0.04% 0.61% 6.80% 1.23% 9.58%
20 Nassau-Suﬀolk, NY 0.33% 1.87% 14.16% 2.59% 18.10%
21 New York, NY 2.05% 5.25% 18.06% 6.67% 20.95%
23 Newark, NJ 0.74% 2.69% 22.24% 4.02% 20.64%
24 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA 0.09% 0.76% 5.57% 1.02% 7.59%
25 Oakland, CA 0.60% 1.71% 6.40% 1.46% 6.87%
26 Orlando, FL 0.31% 0.88% 16.80% 2.01% 12.47%
27 Philadelphia, PA-NJ 0.06% 1.09% 5.40% 1.33% 5.84%
28 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ 0.68% 0.93% 8.28% 1.20% 13.51%
29 Pittsburgh, PA 0.00% 0.57% 6.00% 0.55% 6.84%
30 Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 0.10% 1.07% 8.90% 1.76% 14.62%
31 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 1.49% 1.56% 11.24% 2.89% 22.81%
32 Sacramento, CA 0.66% 1.37% 11.06% 3.24% 13.96%
33 St. Louis, MO-IL 0.02% 0.39% 5.64% 0.44% 7.43%
34 San Antonio, TX 2.31% 0.62% 6.57% 1.14% 7.54%
35 San Diego, CA 2.29% 1.78% 20.73% 3.36% 26.89%
36 San Francisco, CA 1.50% 3.44% 17.15% 5.69% 24.69%
37 San Jose, CA 1.25% 3.28% 13.27% 8.06% 20.00%
38 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 0.11% 1.87% 5.70% 2.73% 10.46%
39 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 0.61% 1.07% 13.78% 1.66% 15.18%
40 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 0.49% 2.00% 24.58% 3.48% 29.46%
41 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 0.67% 1.46% 22.92% 3.01% 25.02%
Total 3.68% 2.06% 20.31% 3.27% 25.77%
Notes: The top ten MSAs in each ranking, which deﬁne the top tercile in the data, are shown in
bold letters. The last four columns correspond to the γ estimate from the two Censuses. The
TOP (γ) indicator variable is based on the 1980 Census, and is equal to one for the MSAs that are
in bold letters.
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Table 3: Reporting Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Was the crime reported to police? (0/1)
All MSAs with many illegal Hisp. MSAs with few illegal Hisp.
Pre and Hispanic -0.024 -0.020 -0.015 -0.020 -0.035* -0.043** 0.002 0.020
(0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027) (0.024)
Post and Hispanic -0.045** -0.039** -0.034** -0.027** -0.044** -0.036** -0.035 -0.020
(0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023)
Hispanic -0.014 -0.003 -0.019 -0.018 -0.015 -0.007 -0.010 -0.024
(0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.019)
MSA ﬁxed eﬀects
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Year ﬁxed eﬀects
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Socioeconomic characteristics
√ √ √ √ √
Crime-type ﬁxed eﬀects
√ √ √ √
MSA speciﬁc time trends
√ √ √
Observations 99973 99973 99973 99973 44149 44149 55824 55824
R-squared 0.001 0.009 0.110 0.111 0.007 0.121 0.003 0.104
Mean dep. var 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.383 0.383 0.403 0.403
Illegal hispanics 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.163 0.163 0.0776 0.0776
Illegal non-hispanics 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 0.0117 0.0176 0.0176 0.00823 0.00823
Notes: The socioeconomic variables include age group dummies, gender, number of household
members, and dummies for household income categories. Clustered standard errors (by year and
MSA) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Reporting Regressions by Crime Types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Was the crime reported to police? (0/1)
Crime type Violent Economic Robbery Burglary Theft Assault
Pre and Hispanic -0.074 -0.032* -0.077 0.011 -0.044* -0.045
(0.045) (0.019) (0.065) (0.047) (0.023) (0.063)
Post and Hispanic -0.031 -0.043** -0.094 -0.033 -0.037 0.003
(0.052) (0.019) (0.083) (0.051) (0.024) (0.067)
Hispanic 0.036 0.002 -0.037 -0.049 0.005 0.053
(0.043) (0.016) (0.060) (0.042) (0.021) (0.059)
Observations 6558 37871 1863 7294 28714 4537
Mean dep. var 0.522 0.368 0.572 0.521 0.316 0.502
R-squared 0.031 0.015 0.105 0.041 0.013 0.026
Illegal hispanics 0.130 0.149 0.143 0.152 0.149 0.120
Illegal non-hispanics 0.0147 0.0161 0.0170 0.0162 0.0161 0.0139
Notes: All regressions are restricted to MSAs with many undocumented immigrants of Hispanic
origin. All regressions include MSA and year ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as age group dummies, gender,
number of household members, and dummies for household income categories. Clustered standard
errors (by year and MSA) in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We ﬁrst characterize how the amnesty impacts on the
thresholds θˆp, θˆa and θ¯ deﬁned in the paper. This is shown in Claim 1 below where
we let θ¯′, θˆ′a and θˆ
′
p denote the thresholds after the amnesty.
Claim 1: an amnesty that legalizes a fraction x ∈ (0, 1] of immigrants increases
θˆp and θˆa while reducing θ¯. The change in the thresholds is larger the higher is the
initial share of undocumented immigrants.
Proof of Claim 1. Consider θˆp and θˆ
′
p. Notice that θˆ
′
p− θˆp = ξ(C(ρ¯i(x))−C(ρ¯i))Π(w¯i,w¯n) > 0
since ρ¯i(x) > ρ¯i; hence the amnesty causes an increase in θˆp. Moreover, notice that:
∂(θˆ′p − θˆp)
∂γ
=
ξ
Π(w¯i, w¯n)
[C ′(ρ¯i(x))(1− x)(ρp,a − ρp,l)− C ′(ρ¯i)(ρp,a − ρp,l)] > 0,
provided that (ρp,a − ρp,l) < (1 − x)(ρp,a − ρp,l) < 0 and C ′(ρ¯i(x)) < C ′(ρ¯i) by the
concavity of the expected punishment function. Therefore, the increase in θˆp caused
by the amnesty is larger the higher the initial share of undocumented immigrants.
Similar arguments can be used to show that the amnesty causes an increase in θˆa, a
decrease in θ¯ and that both changes are more marked the larger γ. 
Let X
′
i and X
′
n denote the number of criminals targeting the two groups after the
amnesty. Let also
X = Xi +Xn = γ(1− θˆa) + (1− γ + φ)(1− θˆp), (7)
X ′ = X ′i +X
′
n = γ(1− x)(1− θˆ′a) + (1− γ + φ+ γx)(1− θˆ′p), (8)
denote the overall level of crime without and with the amnesty, respectively.
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Notice that the amnesty reduces the overall level of crime:
X ′ −X = γ(θˆa − θˆ′a) + (1− γ + φ)(θˆp − θˆ′p) + γx(θˆ′a − θˆ′p) < 0 (9)
since θˆa < θˆ
′
a and θˆp < θˆ
′
p by Claim 1 and θˆ
′
a < θˆ
′
p from f(wp, ρp,l) > f(wp, ρa,l).
Notice that the ﬁrst two terms of expression (9) represent the reduction in crime
due to the increased average reporting rate of immigrants; the last term, instead, is
the reduced level of criminality related to the higher opportunity cost of becoming
criminals experienced by the legalized immigrants.
Taking the derivative of expression (9), it is possible to check that the reduction
in crime is greater the higher the initial share of undocumented immigrants:
∂(X ′ −X)
∂γ
= (θˆa − θˆ′a)− (θˆp − θˆ′p) + x(θˆ′a − θˆ′p) + γ
∂(θˆa − θˆ′a)
∂γ
+(1− γ + φ)∂(θˆp − θˆ
′
p)
∂γ
+ γx
∂(θˆ′a − θˆ′p)
∂γ
< 0. (10)
Notice indeed that (θˆ′p − θˆ′a) = (θˆp − θˆa) = [f(wp, ρp,l) − f(wp, ρp,a)]/Π(w¯i, w¯n);
hence, the sum of the ﬁrst two terms as well as the last term (θˆ′p− θˆ′a does not depend
on γ) are null. The rest of the terms appearing in the above expression are all negative
from Claim 1.
Confronting the number of criminals targeting natives with and without the
amnesty:
X ′n −Xn = (1 + φ)(θ¯ − θ¯′) > 0,
if follows that the the amnesty increases the number of criminals targeting natives.
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The derivative:
∂(X ′n −Xn)
∂γ
= (1 + φ)
∂(θ¯ − θ¯′)
∂γ
> 0,
which implies that the increase in the number of criminals targeting immigrants is
more marked the higher the initial number of undocumented immigrants. Clearly,
given the impact on X (overall level of crime) and on Xn (number of criminals target-
ing natives), the eﬀect of the amnesty is to increase the share of criminals targeting
natives; this eﬀect is stronger the higher γ. As a consequence, the eﬀect on the share
of criminals targeting immigrants is opposite: it reduces after the amnesty and this
variation is more marked the higher the initial share of undocumented immigrants. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the expression for X ′n − Xn shown in the proof
of Proposition 1 and computing the variation in the number of criminals targeting
immigrants, X ′i−Xi = γ(θ¯′− θ¯+ θˆa− θˆ′a) + (1− γ+φ)(θ¯′− θ¯+ θˆp− θˆ′p) + γx(θˆ′a− θˆ′p),
it follows that the change in crime to which immigrants are exposed amounts to:
Xex′i −Xexi = γ
[
(2ξ − 1)(θ¯′ − θ¯) + ξ(θˆa − θˆ′a)
]
+(1− γ + φ)
[
(2ξ − 1)(θ¯′ − θ¯) + ξ(θˆp − θˆ′p)
]
+ γxξ(θˆ′a − θˆ′p) < 0. (11)
The ﬁrst term into the two square brackets is negative since ξ > 1/2. All the other
terms are negative from Claim 1 and from θˆ′a < θˆ
′
p; hence the number of criminals to
which immigrants are exposed reduces. The derivative:
∂(Xex′i −Xexi )
∂γ
= ξ(θˆa − θˆ′a − θˆp + θˆ′p) + xξ(θˆ′a − θˆ′p),
is negative since the ﬁrst term is null (recall that θˆ′p − θˆ′a = θˆp − θˆa, as shown in
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the proof of Proposition 1) while the second term is negative because θˆ′a < θˆ
′
p. Hence,
the reduction in the number of criminals to which immigrants are exposed is larger
the higher the initial share of undocumented immigrants.
The change in crime to which natives are exposed amounts to:
Xex′n −Xexn = γ
[
(2ξ − 1)(θ¯ − θ¯′) + (1− ξ)(θˆa − θˆ′a)
]
+(1− γ + φ)
[
(2ξ − 1)(θ¯ − θ¯′) + (1− ξ)(θˆp − θˆ′p)
]
+ γx(1− ξ)(θˆ′a − θˆ′p). (12)
This expression is positive for ξ = 1 since in this case Xex′n −Xexn coincides with
the change in the number of criminals targeting the natives (which is positive from
what shown in Proposition 1). In the case, ξ = 1/2, Xex′n −Xexn reduces to:
γ(θˆa − θˆ′a)
2
+
(1− γ + φ)(θˆp − θˆ′p)
2
+
γx(θˆ′a − θˆ′p)
2
< 0.
Hence, in this case the number of criminals to which natives are exposed diminishes
after the amnesty. 
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Figure 9: Reporting rates in all MSAs (left) and in those in top tercile by size of the
Undocumented Hispanic population (right).
Notes: Based on NCVS data matched with the 1980 Census.
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Figure 10: Reporting rates in MSAs with top tercile (top) and bottom two terciles
(bottom) by size of the Legal or Illegal Hispanic population.
Notes: Based on NCVS data matched with the 1980 Census.
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